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Oversight and Counterintelligence Draw Speakers' Focus at Dinners

Echoing two of the themes of this year's AFIO Convention, Washington attorney Mitchel Rogovin and *Readers' Digest* editor John Barron, in addresses delivered at the convention's luncheon and banquet sessions, added new insight to issues with which they have deep familiarity.

Rogovin, who served as special counsel to the DCI during the tumultuous investigative period of the 1970's, detailed the Intelligence Community's relationships with the Church and Pike Committees as it attempted to respond to those committees' frequently hostile charges.

apprehended in the West—which he told the banquet audience have been disastrous for the Soviets and have left the USSR's intelligence services in severe disarray. Barron expressed strong sentiments about the destruction of U.S. security and counterintelligence during the 1970's and questioned how much the United States has regained of what was lost at the time. What good is a National Agency Check, he asked, when all the records have been destroyed? Barron was also critical of what he views as inadequate internal security efforts to thwart Soviet agents.



John Barron
Honorary Director
and Banquet Speaker



Mitch Rogovin
Luncheon Speaker

He reminded the luncheon audience of the political attitudes and public reactions of the period which caused the investigations to end with a whimper, not a bang, and gave his overall assessment of the effort. After all the issues were aired, Rogovin said, it was concluded that "CIA was not as bad as depicted, nor as good as they thought themselves."

Barron, who had just returned from providing expert testimony at the trial of a former FBI agent accused of espionage, detailed major Soviet recruitment successes in recent years and the impact each has had on our nation's security. He also reviewed recent Soviet intelligence failures—senior level defections and personnel

Gene Tighe Elected President Thomas Remains Board Chairman

The newly-constituted AFIO Board of Directors has announced that it has elected LG Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. (USAF-Ret.), as President for the coming year. He will be assisted by Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, who was elected Vice President. Reelected as Secretary and Treasurer, respectively, were Charlotta P. Engrav and Robert J. Novak.

During its convention meeting, the Board also re-elected MG Jack E. Thomas (USAF-Ret.) as its Chairman, and continued Dr. Louis W. Tordella as Vice Chairman.

Elected to begin three-year terms on the Board are: Capt. Richard W. Bates (USN-Ret.), John F. Blake, BG Harry T. Hagaman (USMC-Ret.), Newton S. Miler, MG Jack E. Thomas (USAF-Ret.), John H. Waller, and Lloyd George Wiggins.

In addition, those continuing on the Board of Directors are: Ann Caracristi, LTG John J. Davis (USA-Ret.), Lee Echols, Samuel Halpern, Lawrence R. Houston, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., MG Richard X. Larkin (USA-Ret.), Dr. Pforzheimer, David Atlee Phillips, John Anson Smith, LG Tighe, Dr. Tordella, W. Raymond Wannall, and John S. Warner.

Capt. Bates, Halpern, Houston, Tordella and Waller will also serve as AFIO's Executive Committee.

*The speaker observed that the recent 10% reduction in those granted classified access proved no problem for DoD. "It turns out we already have an 11% reduction." Coupled with this reduction of those given clearances, he said, must come an understanding that clearance doesn't mean automatic access. The need-to-know doctrine, "violated widely over the years," must be enforced, he said.

Other areas being addressed are the numbers permitted to classify documents. Stilwell noted that at present 2,533 have original classification authority and 10,000 have derivative authority. He cited the need for greater counterintelligence and counterespionage efforts, and called for a permanent, discretionary authority for the Secretary of Defense to use the polygraph for counterintelligence purposes. The security adjudication process must be improved, Stilwell said, and the double or multiple security standards used throughout DoD must be standardized. On document security, the speaker suggested that DoD elements should be asked how many "tons" of classified information they have destroyed over the last six months. "Why should a document over ten years old exist in any compartment in more than one copy?"

Stilwell noted that current trends toward the paperless office run the risk of one or two "bad eggs" gaining access to sensitive information, a new concern to be addressed.

The speaker urged that "we prioritize the do-able things," and that there be increased professionalism in and stature for the security profession.

Newton S. (Scotty) Miler, a former counterintelligence official with CIA, echoed that necessity calls for more comprehensive CI-CE programs. There is a need, he said, for us to be more concerned and alert to the lessons of recent espionage cases. Now is the time, Miler said, to consider a *centralized* look at the CI question and to integrate, at the basic level, many of the mechanisms of counterintelligence. The problem is compounded, he observed, by the loss of files and institutional memory which make it more difficult to analyze and follow up on the leads given by recent Soviet defectors. "We may not have the resources we should have to follow up on such leads," Miler said.

The counterintelligence philosophy should be instilled not only in the intelligence community, but in industry, which has just as much at stake in the nation's future. Obviously, he said, there must be greater efforts in regard to compartmentation, document dissemination and need-to-know. But what must be done also is to look at the philosophy of CI/CE over the past decade. An "ideal" of what it should be should be modeled and serve as a guide for development. Miler advocated that although the concept of centralized counterintelligence files has been controversial, a felt need dictates that the concept should be restudied. It should also be possible, once again, for officers to serve a career in counterintelligence, Miler said, in reviving the concept of institutional memory and specialization in CI. Such careerists, he said, are needed in both research and active operations. He also called for greater emphasis in "the penetrating of the other side." Another effort might be to reintegrate security program mechanisms with counterintelligence. "There must be a close relationship between CI and security people," Miler said.

It is important to develop a management concern for CI-CE. "It is a vital concern and requires leadership," Miler said. Leadership must learn, he said, that success is not determined by document dissemination. Many of the benefits of CI are intangible and cannot be measured so visually. And, despite recent cases, it is important that management not be mesmerized into belief that all hostile intelligence successes stem from greed. The regrowth of counterintelligence, Miler said, "should not be motivated by paranoia; rather, it should be propelled by knowledge."

A fresh approach to the issue was presented by Donald Moore, a former counterintelligence agent with the FBI. In a highly anecdotal review of his career, beginning with Nazi espionage cases during WWII, Moore recalled some of the lessons he learned in becoming a counterintelligence specialist. For example, in reminiscing about the interrogation of one Nazi agent, he thought then of "how much my mother would like her." Thus the lesson, "You can't tell a spy from the cover."

After one notable clash with the fates, Moore learned that "the CI man must be prepared for every eventuality." Nor should the specialist disbelieve the unusual ("Don't disbelieve that the documents are hidden in a pumpkin") or dismiss anonymous information out of hand. Lax security determined in some of the earlier cases prompted Moore to add yet another rule: "If you have real secrets, you had better protect them." Recalling his experience with one Soviet agent, Moore suggested this rule: "Don't say you can't deal with a drunk." Such misfits, he said, often become the "lead singer in the choir." Another

of Moore's rules is to be aware how easy it is for an adversary to obtain documentation of another in this country. (He recalled how the false documentation of Rudolph Ivanovich Abel had come from an early CPUSA program to assemble documentation of infants who had died at birth, and how in later cases the Soviets had merely created duplicates of living Americans.)

In discussing recent espionage cases, Moore observed that most of the spies were not working for the Soviets when they went to work for the government. This results in another Moore rule: find out what happened along the way. ("There were things that happened to these people that should have given us something to look at.")

During the question and answer session that followed, among the issues raised was the traditional absence of career enhancement for those who devote themselves to a counterintelligence career. The question was answered from the floor by guest MG Thomas Weinstein, ACSI, who explained that recent improvements in the Army's programs include career recognition. Another issue was that of budget priorities, with Gen. Stilwell observing that one technical security program last year "wasted" 1/2 billion dollars, many times the entire cost of the Defense Investigative Service. He was not advocating mindless scrapping of the program, it was indicated; rather, it serves as an example of the need for establishing intelligence priorities. The stifling effect of the Privacy Act on personnel security investigations was also discussed.



Robert Gates
DDI, CIA

Openness, Changed Environment To Shape Intelligence of Future

Ten trends seen today will dominate intelligence to the end of the century, according to Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA. As a panelist addressing "The Future of the Intelligence Community," Gates noted that many of the trends are already established, while others are linked to technological development certain to come.

He described the coming revolution in which intelligence will be communicated to policy makers' desks electronically, resulting in promptness, greater interaction between the policymaker and the producer and having significant security advantages. Gates noted also that intelligence data is becoming harder and harder to collect as camouflage, denial, and the inhibiting reaction to unauthorized disclosures force us to seek other collection means for that once available openly. Recruitment of personnel is also becoming more difficult, he said, because the number of people who can meet security standards and pass polygraph screening is declining, resulting in the need for a greater pool of applicants at initial stages. Also influencing recruitment, Gates said, is that government service is becoming less attractive.

There has been a revolution as well, he explained, in the role of intelligence in regard to Congress. Not only is the flow of intelligence information to Congress as heavy as that to the Executive Branch, but the large number of staff on the Hill makes the Congress better prepared to ask questions than the Executive Branch entities receiving the same information. There has also been an increased use of intelligence by the Executive Branch for public education, a tribute to the accuracy and integrity with which the American people view such reporting. In the international arena, Gates indicated, there has been a growing use of intelligence to convince our allies, and certain nations beyond traditional allies, of the rectitude of U.S. policies.

Another challenge has been the dramatic increase in the diversity of the subjects intelligence must now address, far from those early days when the focus was limited to potential adversaries. Today, for example, the Community must serve requirements dealing with nuclear proliferation, international narcotics, foreign technological development, human rights, technology transfer, population, religion and the like. Similarly, there has been an immense growth in the diversity of the users or consumers of intelligence. Gates observed that intelligence in the past decade has become steadily more central to national decision making, noting that in some cases there might not be a national policy without the contributions of the Intelligence Community. He also suggested that it often appears the Intelligence Community is the only part of the government looking to the future, as one sees the withering of long range planning in other agencies. He noted one problem stemming from such progress: the policy maker is faced with addressing future problems when costs are low, yet receives no benefit from doing so. The rewards of such efforts will be seen only by his or her successors.



Intelligence Future
LG Lincoln Faurer

The future may see more openness, a cultural change in sharing with and seeking of assistance from elements outside the Intelligence Community, predicted LG Lincoln D. Faurer (USAF-Ret.), the former Director of NSA. The Community "pays and continues to pay every day," he said, for the cultural overprotection of the past.

In explaining his advocacy, Faurer addressed some of the issues confronting NSA. Development of advanced information systems, he noted, is a growth industry, an industry yet to be "converted" to recognize the need for computer security. The Intelligence Community will have to work in partnership with industry to seek such a fundamental change, the former NSA Director said. In the area of communications security, Faurer observed that 90% of U.S. telephone calls are easily intercepted by adversaries because they are carried by microwave. Satellite down-links and almost all computer transmission systems also hold such vulnerability. He observed that the fifty billion dollars transmitted electronically every day in the U.S. holds great potential for such mischief.

Faurer observed that the track record of secure communications, on the whole has been spotty and poor, despite some exceptional successes. What is needed, he said, is outside help, new initiatives

and changes in present methodology. Among these are the partnership between government and industry, a commitment to education, an attack on COMSEC illiteracy aimed at both government users and marketers in industry, and the encouragement of risk-taking by industry to advance protective technologies. This will require, Faurer said, a reduction in the stringency of security limitations by pursuing a cooperative, but controlled, openness. "We must give a little in the security area so that we can gain security in a macro way," he said, "replacing the traditional green door with a mesh door . . ."

There must be technical and intellectual exchange with academia and industry while maintaining a highly protected intelligence environment, Faurer said. Carefully selected people must be recruited to improve computer security as massive parallel processing of national security information becomes a necessity.

Within the Intelligence Community, the former NSA director said, there must be a major change in the traditional demarcation or compartmentation between "tactical" and "strategic" intelligence. He called for integration of organizational assets to address both without the costly redundancy seen today. The budget process, Faurer said, will drive this change. "We must be more disciplined in what to go after and which we can afford." Minimizing and prioritizing competing requirements, "an area where we have failed in the past," will permit the "wobble room" to meet other urgent requirements for which the Community will not be given additional money and personnel.

Phil Parker, Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI, noted the strides made in recent years to enhance the Bureau's counterintelligence capabilities. This has been made possible, he said,



Phil Parker
FBI

because policy makers and the Congress recognize the need for increased resources. Coupled with this growth must be an adjustment of current security practices, more thorough counterintelligence analysis and innovative operational security measures to reduce vulnerability. And, although CI will become a battle of technologies by the end of the century, the business of counterintelligence will continue to revolve around the human agent, Parker said.

The FBI official reviewed recent long-term espionage cases which have caused the nation serious damage, noting that we have learned in recent years that the ideologically-motivated spy of the past is very rare. Today's hostile recruits are voluntarily-inspired mercenaries guided by greed and profit, he said.

This calls for continuing advances in personnel training, analytical techniques and technological aids, Parker said. In the discussion that followed, Gates added the importance of stressing the role of the manager. He or she must remain alert to indications of life-style changes in employees, and not rely solely on the initial security adjudication as a basis for continuing clearability. The theme was echoed by Faurer who stressed the importance of periodic reinvestigation of personnel in sensitive positions.